Śaiva Theory of Relation


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ALLAHABAD:

SUPERINTENDENT, PRINTING AND STATIONERY, UNITED PROVINCES, INDIA

1938

ŚAIVA THEORY OF RELATION.

Importance of Relation in experience.

Philosophy primarily aims at explaining different types of experiences. Every experience involves some kind of relation among the experienced, and of the experienced with the experiencer. In fact, experience entirely depends upon the latter type of relation. No philosophy is, therefore, complete unless it explains the essential nature of the thing on which all experiences depend.

If we take just the following experiences into consideration, we find that each of them involves a relation.

(1) Father's son (पितुः पुत्रः).

(2) The branch of a tree (वृक्षस्य शाखा).

(3) The king's servant (राज्ञः पुरुषः).

(4) Man and horse (पुरुषश्चाश्वश्च).

(5) A blue lotus (नीलमुत्पलम्)

(6) Devadatta cooks rice in a pot with wood (देवदत्तः काष्ठैः स्थाल्यामोदनं पचति).

(7) The jar does not exist (घटस्याभावः).

(8) This is different from that (इदमस्मादन्यत्).

The experiences often assume a form quite opposite to those stated above, as follows :

The son's father, etc.

The following are the relations involved :

(1) Parental (पितृपुत्रभावः)
(2) Part and whole (अवयवावयविभावः)
(3) Dependance (स्वस्वामिभावः)
(4) Co-ordination (इतरेतरयोगः)
(5) Substantive and adjective (विशेषणवि[illegible]भावः)
(6) Action and its ac[illegible]ies (क्रिया[illegible]न्धः)
(7) Non-being (अभावः)
(8) Difference (भेदः)

The difference of these relations from one another is fairly obvious, but in order to find out the essential nature of relation, it is necessary to understand the common

point in all, which distinguishes relation from all other things.

Taking all the above instances into consideration, we find that relation is ultimately based on two external realities. We cannot, however, define relation as that which is based on two co-existing external realities, because then we cannot talk of any relation between the seed and the sprout that is yet to be. In actual life, we talk of relation as in "the sprout requires the seed for its being." This statment is made before the sprout actually comes into being. [1]Requirement (अपेक्षा), therefore, is obviously a relation that exists between a thing, that is to come into being, and its material cause. If relation is conceived as something that depends on two co-existing external realities the conception would be too narrow to apply to this instance.

The essential nature of relation.

Relation has no separate external reality, apart from the facts of experience. It is merely a dependent category of knowledge. It is based on the general category (ekānekarūpo,rthaḥ). The analysis of any experience reveals the operation of the general category. The following illustration will clear the point :

[2]When a person hears the word राज्ञः, the image that arises in his consciousness is that of the king. This image, however, does not satisfy the hearer, because it is associated with the feeling of incompleteness aroused

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[1]अ[illegible]ध्यात्मनश्चात्मलाभार्थमपेक्षादि कथ्यते ।
न च [illegible]दानीमद्विष्ठत्वात्संबन्धार्थोपपत्तिः ॥

S. S. 2 (K.S.S. Edition)

[2]रा[illegible]ा यदा पूर्वं धिया गृहीतोऽपि न स्वात्मविश्रान्त्या तुष्यति तदा रूपान्तरे[illegible] पुंसा श्लेषं भजन् कृतार्थीभवति, पुरुषोऽप्येवम्, स च एष रूपश्लेष एव[illegible] एव, उभयोः चिदा[illegible] तथावस्थानरूपः पूर्वप्रतिलब्धसंवित्प्रतिष्ठे तत [illegible]धिकसंवि[illegible] अनाभासमानपृथग्भवनलक्षणस्वातन्त्र्ये विश्राम्यति, इति तत्रैव निभासित[illegible]भास्कान्दितपुरुषपरमार्थोऽपि, एवं बहिरनेकता, अन्तस्तु परस्पररूपश्लेषेणैक्यम्, इति संबन्धस्य रूपम् ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh, 2. kā 4.

by the genitive case-ending. At the next moment he hears the word पुरुषः and the image of a man arises in the consciousness. At this moment the image of the king has retired to the sub-conscious. A similar feeling of incompleteness, as was associated with the king, arises associated with the man now present in the consciousness. This consciousness of incompleteness brings the consciousness of the king from sub-consciousness to consciousness. The two images stand together. The two are looked upon as a whole, because there is no more incompleteness. In this conception of the whole the two are not merged in the subject. They stand apart from it. They are not conceived as merged in each other nor standing absolutely apart from each other. They represent unity in difference, both of which appear and disappear at the same time, and not one after another

The following are the special categories.

Not only relation is based on the general category which is unity and multiplicity, but there are others, such as action, universal, object, space and time, though they are admitted to be external realities by the realists.

Analysis of the special category of relation.

[3]Relation is admittedly an elaboration of the general category. The two phases of the general category, the unity and multiplicity, are found in different objects or in the so-called different states of the same object. Multiplicity is associated with the objects as they exist outside the consciousness, independently of each other. Unity, however, is associated with them as they figure in the consciousness joined together as one. [4]This unity is due to the independent unifying activity of the subject. Of the two phases of unity and plurality, unity is predominant, plurality being only in the subconscious state,

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[3]क्रियासंबन्धसामान्यद्रव्यदिक्कालबुद्धयः ।
सत्याः स्थर्थोपयोगाभ्यामेकानेकाश्रया मताः ॥
I. P. V., adhi. II, āh 2, kā 1.

[4]तद्द्वयालंबना एता मनोऽनुव्यवसायि सत् ।
करोति मातृव्यापारमयीः कर्मादिकल्पनाः ॥
I. P. V., adhi. II, āh 2, kā 3.

because of its having arisen in consequence of separate cognition of two things. The relation between the two related as they figure unified in the consciousness is similar to that of an object and its attributes.

What relation involves.

[5]Unity and plurality both are involved in relation. Neither of the two by itself is sufficient. For, if plurality by itself were enough, the category of relation should operate (or things should appear related) independently of the unifying activity of the subject. Similarly, if unity by itself were enough, even a single independent object should be sufficient to arouse the consciousness of relation.

[6]All the special categories involve unity in difference. While in some cases both are without, in others either the element of unity or that of difference is only within. In the case of relation, for instance, the unity is only within the subject, whereas plurality is both within and without. In the case of universal and the individual, both the unity and multiplicity are without as well as within.

Action.

The following is the manner in which the category of action operates. The analysis of the psychological process involved reveals that it also, like relation, implies the general category which is unity and multiplicity :—

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[5]स च संश्लेषार्थ अनेकस्यैकता कथ्यते, न त्वनैकतैव नाप्येकतैव अपि तु उभयावस्थापेक्षोऽयमर्थः संबन्धः । अत एव न बहूनामेकः संबन्धः । यदि हि अनेकत्वमात्रमेकत्वमात्रं वा संबन्धः स्यात् तद् बहूनामपि एकतापत्तौ एकतानापत्तावपि वा स्यात्, एकमात्रस्यापि च स्यात् ।

S. S., p. 2—3 (K.S.S. Edition)

[6]जातिद्रव्यावभासानां बहिरप्येकरूपताम् ।
व्यक्त्येकदेशभेदं चाप्यालंबन्ते विकल्पनाः ॥

जात्यवभासस्य---अवभासमानरूपाया जातेः, ग्राहिका याः कल्पनास्ता न केवलं संबन्धवदन्तः एकरूपतां बहिश्चानेकरूपतामालंबन्ते यावद्बहिरपि व्यक्तिभेदलक्षणमनैक्यं बहिरेव च तदनुस्यूततारूपामेकतामालंबनत्वं भजन्ति ।

I. P. V., adhi II,, āh. 2. kā. 5.

[7]When an object is seen for a certain duration of time, at any moment of that duration, difference in its associations is visualized. Such knowledge of an object gives rise to two ideas, the idea of multiplicity because of multiplicity in associations at different moments, and the idea of unity or sameness because of the consciousness of a persisting element in all the different associations. Thus a set of successive cognitions gives rise to two ideas, unity and multiplicity. When these two ideas are unified in consciousness, there is awareness of unity in multiplicity which in its operation is called the general category. The special category of action is based on this. Thus the basis of the dependent category of action is the general category which is discovered through an analysis of the facts of experience.

Universal.

[8]It is a matter of common experience that when a number of cows is perceived, we perceive two things :

(i) The difference of one individual cow from another which is responsible for our referring to them in the plural number.

(ii) A non-varying and recurring element which is responsible for our use of the word "cow" for all of them. Both of them have an independent reality, because we use the pronoun "these" in reference to them.

Object.

[9]In our experience of any physical object, we perceive two things : (i) the parts of which that object is made

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[7]तत्तद्देशकालाकारभिन्नस्तत्र चैत्रदेहोऽनेकस्वभावोऽपि स एवायमिति एकरूपतामपरित्यजन्नेव निर्भासते, स एव चैकानेकरूपो ऽर्थः क्रिया ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 1.

[8]गाव इति हि प्रतिभासे पृथग् च ताः बहिर्व्यक्तयो भान्ति येन च बहुवचनम्, अनुयायि चासां भाति वपुः यदेकप्रातिपदिकार्थपरामर्शानुगमः, उभयं च तद् बहिरेव इमा इत्यङ्गुल्या निर्देशात् ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 5.

[9]अवयवानां यदैक्यं वैतत्यं च देशतः सोऽवयवी ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh 2, kā. 4.

up, (ii) the object as a whole, apart from the parts, which is referred to by one name, e. g "jar." (i) stands for multiplicity and (ii) stands for unity, both of which are also outside.

Relative position (*Dik*)

[10]Two external objects are seen at successive moments. But the human mind as we know from experience, never stops at seeing things as such only. It relates them in such a manner that they form one object of apprehension. These objects are often conceived as occupying different *relative positions*. For instance, we talk of one object being in front of another, or to the right or to the left of another. Both the objects appear simultaneously in the consciousness. In this case, one appears as having different sides to it, and the other as existing on one of its sides. Accordingly we talk of one as occupying a position relative to the other.

Often, however, we talk of one object being near another or far from it. In this case, there is perception, not only of two distinct external objects, but also of the things that come between them. When all these objects figure simultaneously in the consciousness, consequent on successive perceptions, we talk of distance or proximity of the two in question, according as the number or size or both are small or great.

Time.

[11]Time is also a special category which is based on the general category that is unity in multiplicity. We

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[10]अस्मादिदं पूर्वं परं दूरे इत्येवं बहिर्भिन्नतया परामृश्यमानयोर्भावयोरन्तरभेदपूर्वकं भेदावमर्शमध्यमभेदविश्रान्तं च यद्रूपमामृश्यते तद्दिगित्युच्यते । अत्र हि तयोः मुखाद्यवयवविशेषपरामर्शादरः तत्संमुखत्वपराङ्मुखत्वादिनिश्चयः संयोगसंयुक्तसंयोगाल्पतादिपरिग्रहश्चोपयोगी ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh 2, kā. 6.

[11]कालः सूर्यादिसंचारः तत्तत्पुष्पादिजन्म वा ।
शीतोष्णे वाथ तल्लक्ष्यः क्रम एव स तत्त्वतः ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 1, kā. 3.

observe certain phenomena happening in a regular order. We accept them as standards of measure. There are other things which happen without any regularity. The latter we measure in terms of the former. The judgment consequently reached is "*A* is six years old." Taking a concrete instance to make the point clear, we would put the proposition as follows : *X* sees the sun rising at a particular spot and setting at another. This happens with absolute regularity. He sees other events which lack this regularity, for instance, he sees a student going to college. It means his seeing the student as associated with different places. Such association is, however, not invariable. But he wants to get a correct idea of the irregular succession involved in going. He, therefore, puts it before his mind's eye by the side of the regular succession involved in the movement of the sun, measures it in terms of the latter and says : "he takes two hours to reach college." Thus we find that the special category of time is based upon a general category which is unity and multiplicity, the latter inasmuch as it is made up of the successive manifestations of the sun as associated with different spots and those of *X* as appearing at different points of space, and the former because the whole forms one object of apprehension. Thus we find that in the case of time multiplicity is observed in the facts apprehended, while the unity is in the act of apprehension.

We talk of time in a number of ways. We talk of hours, days, weeks, etc. We also talk of quickness and slowness, priority and posteriority, and present, past and future. These notions are also like the special category of time based on the general category. For instance, when a person says : "*X* studies for two hours," he is calculating the activity of *X* in terms of that of the sun. The only thing to be remembered in this connexion is that because of long-established convention, the movement of the latter over a fixed distance is called "hour." Similarly, when one says, "*X* will go," one relates the possible activity of one's own vital airs with that of the possible movement of *X*. Thus in all experiences of time, it is found that the activities of two things are related.

[12]The ideas of number, measure, separateness conjuction and disjunction are all applications of the special category of relation.

The conclusion might be stated as follows :—

The human mind is so constituted that mental activity does not cease till the knowledge assumes a determinate form.

[13]When the mind perceives an object its activity does not stop till the meaning is complete. It is its nature to connect the percept with other facts. Thus the general category is implied in the special categories in several ways. In some cases the aspect of unity is innate in the act of apprehension while the multiplicity is in the facts experienced. In other cases both the aspects are implied in the knowing processes. In spite of these differences all the special categories invariably imply the category of relation.

The Buddhist objections against relation.

(i) Against its being.

[14] "Sambandha" or relation as represented by the Śaivas involves unity in multiplicity. This means the co-existence of unity and multiplicity. As unity is a negation of multiplicity and *vice versa* it is unreasonable to talk of their co-existence. [15]It is against the facts of

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[12]अत एव मुष्टिप्रस्थपलादिपरिमाणोन्मानरूपं तत्रान्तर्गतं वाणुमहद्दादिसंख्यापृथक्त्वादि च यत् तत्सर्वं संबन्धस्यैव विजृंभितम् ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā 4.

[13]इत्येवं एकात्मतापत्तिपर्यन्तोऽवभासनव्यापारोऽर्थेषु ज्ञानानाम्, न तु परस्परासंलग्नता प्रकाशमात्रात् परिसमाप्यते । परस्परविशेषणविशेष्यभावपरामर्श एवानैकेकतारूपसंबन्धपरामर्शः ।

S. S., p. 8 (K.S.S. Edition).

[14]ननु एकत्वमनेकत्वं च परस्परविरुद्धे कथमेकत्र वस्तुनि स्याताम् । ततश्चायं बाधकप्रमाणकृतः स्थैर्योन्मूलनप्रकारः ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 2.

[15]न चानेकस्यानेकतासहभाविनी एकता युज्यते भावाभावरूपत्वेन विरुद्धत्वात् ।

S. S., p. 4 (K.S.S. Edition).

experience because they are contradictory by nature. Being and not being, for instance, cannot co-exist in the same thing.

(ii) Against its experience.

We have seen that for the Śaiva relation is based on unity in difference. To this the Bauddha objects. The objection is based on two fundamental assumptions of the Bauddha: (i) that everything is momentary and, therefore, cannot be the object of more than one experience, (ii) that which figures in the determinate consciousness has no reality (वस्तुत्व). Analysing the process psychologically we find that unity and diversity are experienced at different moments. As everything is momentary the two experiences cannot refer to the same object. How can then unity and diversity be experienced as co-existing in the same object? Therefore, the conception of object as identity in difference is against a psychological fact.

[16]Secondly, reality (वस्तुत्व) not being attributable to that which merely figures in the determinate consciousness how can the object, even if it be admitted to have identity in difference, be experienced? For, the indeterminate knowledge is incapable of knowing the attributes unity and diversity. As for determinate knowledge, it does not come in direct touch with the external object and, therefore, knowing any such attribute as unity or difference, as associated with independent reality is out of the question. Thus even if, for the sake of argument, it be admitted that such an object exists, it is psychologically impossible to know it.

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[16]बाह्येनेन्द्रियेण चैत्रो विचित्रदेशकः परमनुभूयते, न तु अनेकाभाससंमिश्रीकारे बाह्येन्द्रियजस्याविकल्पकस्य व्यापारः, संनिहितविषयबलोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वादित्याहुः। विकल्पेनापि मानसेन तथाभूतं वस्तु नैव स्पृश्यते इति कया धिया वस्तु एकानेकरूपं गृह्यते।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 3.

Buddhist position.

[17]The Buddhist view, therfore, of relation is that it is a mere concept of unity imposed by the mind on real plurality existing outside. Thus, according to this theory, unity and multiplicity do not subsist together in relation but are associated with two distinct orders of facts, one outside and the other within.

[18]There is thus a want of correspondence between the mental process and the facts outside. But they draw a distinction between relation so viewed and error. It is an error because of the want of correspondence noted above. But it is not the same as ordinary erroneous perception. In this case the knowledge itself, has more correspondence with what occasions it than our apprehension of silver has with mother-of-pearl.

Śaiva answer.

[19]The Śaiva answers that the theory of momentariness is perfectly all right as far as the object is concerned.

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[17]वस्तु घटादि स्वात्ममात्रपरिसमाप्तमन्योन्यव्यावृत्तं इत्थमेव स्वात्मावभासिना प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीयते । कल्पना कल्पितैव सा । ते हि "अमिश्राः स्वयं भावाः तान् योजयति कल्पनेत्याहुः ।

S. S., p. 3 (K.S.S. Edition).

[18]अत एव प्रतीतिकाल एव सामान्यस्येव संबन्धस्याभ्युपगमः । वस्तुस्वरूपविपरीतत्वेन च प्रतीतिः तद्वदेव भ्रान्तिविषयैव, केवलं बाधप्रवृत्तावपि उपकार्योपकारकस्वरूपविशेषावभाससंलग्नत्वादस्य भ्रमस्यावयविभ्रमस्येवानिवृत्तिः सर्पभ्रमवत् । तत एव भ्रान्तेरप्यस्याः संवृतिसंज्ञया व्यपदेशः ।

S. S., p. 4 (K.S.S. Edition).

[19]इह ज्ञानामालाया अन्तःसूत्रकल्पः स्वसंवेदनात्मा प्रमाता जीवितभूतः इति उपपादितं प्राक् । स च स्वतन्त्र इत्यपि निर्गीतिम् ।......

अविकल्पकबोधाबहिर्भूतविमर्शव्यापारस्य पश्चाद्भाविनं व्यवसायं निश्चयात्मकं विकल्पं अनुव्यवसायशब्दवाच्यं विदधदन्तःकरणमेतान् क्रियासंबन्धादिविकल्पान् संपादयति । ते च विकल्पाः तद्द्वयमेकानेकत्वरूपमवलंबन्ते, न हि विकल्पेषु प्रतिभासमानमवस्तु तत् इति हि उक्तं प्रकाशतैव वस्तुत्वमिति ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā 3.

But the subject is permanent. Further, the subject retains the residual traces of previous experiences and has the capacity of unifying a number of experiences and presenting them in a new form at a subsequent time. This new presentation is no less real (वस्तु) than what exists outside consciousness. Because, according to Śaivas, it is not the causal efficiency which constitutes the essential nature of a thing, but the mere fact of shining in the consciousness without being contradicted. Thus, according to the Śaivas, the experience of an object as identity in difference is not psychologically impossible. This experience is not immediate experience (it is not a point, it is not atomic). It is a synthesis of past experiences, it is a mental construction made of the revived residual traces of past experiences.

The following are the points involved :

[20](i) Unity and multiplicity in the same thing are not inexplicable—the universe itself is unity and multiplicity.

[21](ii) Difference in relation is due to the difference in the relata.

[22](iii) Only one thing is apprehended at a time, but worldly transactions depend upon the knowledge of relation that one thing has with another. Hence, in the absence of the consciousness of relation they would cease.

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[20]अस्मिंश्चार्थे सिद्धे नैकैकतारूपःसंसार एव
संबन्धशब्दर्थानुप्रविष्टः इति नास्त्येवात्र दीनता ।

S. S., p. 6 (K.S.S. Edition).

[21]स्यादेक एव सर्वेषामिति यद्येकतामात्रमेव संबन्धः स्यात् । यावतानेकतांशादंशे नैकता संबन्धः ततश्च राजपुरुषोपरक्तैकतान्यः संबन्धः पितापुत्रोपरागोपलक्षणविलक्षण एव । अत एव मायादशायामेवाख्यातिभेद प्रधानायां सबन्धपदार्थसद्भावः ।

S. S., p. 6. (K. S. S. Edition).

[22]यदपि च कारकं तदपि क्रियामुखप्रेक्षि सापि कालं प्राणेश्वरमाश्रयति । सोऽपि क्रियाद्वारेण सर्वभावान् । सापि संबन्धमुद्धरयति इति संबन्धाधीनैवेयं चित्रा लोकयात्रा ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 4.

[23](iv) Relation is always between two things. Even when many things are involved in a relation, they are grouped into two groups and each is looked upon as one thing because of its being the object of one act of apprehension. For instance राज्ञः पुरुषः and राज्ञो हस्त्यश्वरथपदातयः This is very closely connected with the Śaiva theory that oneness or plurality depends not on things themselves, but on the cognitive activity of the subject. Thus even when a number of things form the object of one act of comprehension they are looked upon as one.

The objection against the Śaiva concept of action.

According to the Bauddhas, all objects are momentary. At any given moment, the object is either the same as or different from that of the preceding moment, but certainly it cannot be both. The concept of action, according to the Śaivas, is based upon an external reality which possesses both unity and multiplicity at the same time. Further, these concepts of unity and multiplicity arise, according to the Śaiva's own statement, when an object is seen for a certain duration of time. The position is defective in two ways.

(1) Because everything being momentary it cannot serve as the stimulus of an experience for more than a moment. The same thing, therefore, cannot be seen for a duration of time.

(2) Even if the principle of momentariness be discarded, unity and multiplicity being contradictory things, how can they constitute the essential nature of an object ?

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[23]स च संबन्धो द्वयोरेव भवति न बहूनाम् ।

बहूनां हि किमेकैकस्यान्यैरनेकसंख्यैर्युगपदेव किं वा बहूनां मध्ये एकस्यैकैकेन । तत्र यदि एकैकस्यानेकसंख्यैः तत् किं तेऽनेकसंख्या एवैकपरामर्शगोचरा अथानेकपरामर्शविषया राज्ञः पुरुषः, राज्ञो हस्त्यश्वरथपदातय इति । द्वन्द्वेऽपि हस्त्याद्यनेकत्वेऽपि परामर्शस्यैक्यात् द्वन्द्वाख्यः शब्द एव, हस्त्यादिशब्दा वर्णतुल्याः । एकपरामर्शस्थितो हि शब्दः एको भवति । तदेकशब्दाध्यासादर्थोऽप्येक एव ।

S. S., p. 7 (K. S. S. Edition).

Śaiva answer.

[24]The Śaivas also believe in the momentariness of objects and yet they believe in the validity of mental constructions. Momentariness, however, they associate only with the objective world. The perceiving subject is persisting and is capable of retaining the residual traces of all experiences as also of uniting them with the immediate experience at any given moment and in any form. When the Śaiva talks of the concept of action being based on one object, oneness he associates with the mental construct which is made up of the revived residual traces of the past experiences of the constituents of the series and the last immediate experience. This construct is represented to be one because oneness and plurality are associated with an object according as it is responsible for one or many experiences. As the mental construct in question gives rise to one experience only, i.e. action, it is said to be one.

[25]This construct cannot be classified with others which serve as the basis of the concepts like "error." The reason is obvious. While the experiences based on the latter type of constructs are contradicted at a subsequent moment, that associated with the former remains uncontradicted. The real psychological difference between the two constructs is that while in the case of the latter the material taken from the stock of memory in the form of revived residual traces is associated with the external reality, though in reality it is not, in the former, the association is a fact.

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[24]भवेदेवं यदि विकल्पो नाम स्वतन्त्रो भवेत्, यावता प्रमातुरसौ व्यापारः प्रमाता च पूर्वानुभवान्तःस्वसंवेदनरूपः, तदस्य चायमेव पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारो यद्विकल्पनव्यापारकालेऽपि पूर्वानुभवात्मत्वमनुज्झन्नेवास्ते । ततः पूर्वानुभवो यावत्स्वलक्षणप्रकाशात्मा तावत्पूर्वानुभवतादात्म्यापन्नप्रमातृतत्वव्यापारोऽपि विकल्पस्तद्विषय एव ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2 kā. 3.

[25]क्रिया, तथैव प्रतिभासनाच्च पारमार्थिकी द्विचन्द्रादि तु तथा भासमानमपि उत्तरकालं प्रमाव्यापारानुवृत्तिरूपस्य स्थैर्यस्योन्मूलनेन द्विचन्द्रो नास्तीत्येवंरूपेणासत्यम् ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 1.

[26]As regards the second objection the Śaiva puts a counter question to the Bauddha. How are causality and non-causality found in the same object? For instance, a seed is the cause of the sprout when it is sown on fertile soil and not so when sown on barren soil. If the Bauddha answers that it is because of a difference in circumstances, well, the Śaiva retorts: why is it that difference in circumstances removes contradiction? If it be said that it is a matter of experience, how can the Bauddha reject an appeal to the same experience by the Śaiva in the case of action also? As stated above. the cognition of unity and diversity in the case of action is a matter of our own experience.

[27]As for the difference in reference (विषयभेद) it is not difficult to point it out in the case of action also. The element of unity in action refers to the concept of personality of Devadatta with whom the action is associated —personality which is recognized to be the same in the midst of varying circumstances of time, place, etc. which remains intact in spite of all associations, which is the central fact in all associations, which is cognized only through the inner sense and is never the object of outer sense contact. Multiplicity refers to the multiplicity of circumstances in which this personality is found. As such, it is the object of sense perception.

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[26]यत्तूक्तमेकमेव कथमनेकं भवतीति तत्रोच्यते इह कारणमेव कथमकारणं भवति, अथोच्यते विषयभेदात्तथेति, तद्विषयभेदे एतन्न विरुध्यते इति केनायं वितीर्णो वरः ? संवेदनेनेति चेत् चलतीत्यादौ संवेदनमेवास्माभिः प्रमाणीकृतं किमिति न सह्यते ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 2.

[27]विषयभेदोऽपि चात्र वक्तुं न न शक्यते, तथाहि आभासान्तरेणासंवेदने तदेकाभासमात्रम्,........................एकमिति प्रतीयते । तदेव देशाभासेनेहामुत्रेति कालाभासेनाधुना तदानीमिति स्वभावाभासेन कृशः स्थूल इत्यादिना मिश्रतयानेकमिति बाह्येन्द्रियवेद्यतायां प्रतीयते ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 2.

[28]Speaking from another point of view, there is unity when the Universe exists within the Universal Self, very much like the mass of undifferentiated ideas in the mind of the individual. This very universe, when manifested without and made perceptible to the senses, is many because of the association of different manifestations of time and place.

The Bauddha and the Śaiva views of relation compared.
(i) *Points of similarity.*

(1) According to both, there does take place consciousness of unity in difference.

(2) Both have taken this consciousness as the basis for explaining the concept of relation.

(3) According to both, it is Kalpanā, i.e. a special category.

(4) According to both, it is ultimately based on things which are unrelated.

(5) According to both, there is correspondence of this special category with what figures in the indeterminate knowledge (अर्थविभाससंलग्नत्वम्)

(ii) *Points of difference.*

(1) While the Bauddha maintains that there is difference between a "Kalpanā" like "This is jar" and the one which is called relation, because there is not that amount of correspondence with अर्थविभास in the latter case as there is in the former, the Śaiva maintains that there is the same correspondence. This difference of the Śaiva is based on his difference from the Bauddha in fundamentals. The Bauddha, as a "Vijñānavādin" does not admit the existence of the external world. Everything, therefore, is ultimately essentially consciousness, which appears in its real form only in the indeterminate knowledge. The Śaiva, on the other hand, maintains the

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[28]तथा स्वामिनश्चात्मसंस्थस्येत्युक्तनीत्या विश्वमेवान्तरं सदेकम्, तदेव सान्तर्विपरिवर्तिन उभयेन्द्रियवेद्यत्वमिति वक्ष्यमाणकार्यकारणतत्त्वदृष्टयेन्द्रियवेद्यतायामनेकं देशाद्याभासमिश्रणादिति ।

I. P. V., adhi. II, āh. 2, kā. 2.

existence of the external world which is reflected in consciousness. (2) Further, while, according to the Bauddha, there is essential difference between two forms of consciousness, indeterminate and determinate, according to Śaiva, there is no essential difference between the two. There is only difference in degree. Thus, according to the Bauddha, things figuring in the indeterminate knowledge are as unrelated to one another as the external objects are according to the Śaiva. Hence, there being no external reality for the Bauddha his statement regarding the ultimate dependence of the special category of relation on two things that are independent of each other and related in no way refers to the objects as they figure in the indeterminate knowledge, while, a similar statement of the Śaiva refers to the external reality. (3) Furthermore, because according to Śaiva there is nothing like indeterminate knowledge in the sense of Bauddha, inasmuch as the objects in a less manifested form, figure exactly in the manner in which they are clearly apprehended indeterminate knowedge, there is no difference in correspondence of what figures in the determinate with the indeterminate between the two determinate cognitions.

The Naiyyāyika categories in the eyes of the Śaivas.

Naiyyāyikas are realists. According to them things exist independently of the subject. Śaivas, therefore, have criticized their categories pointing out that most of the things brought under one head or another have no external reality. Amongst the seven primary categories, as many as five, namely, कर्म सामान्य, समवाय, विशेष. and अभाव have no such existence. Amongst those that are put under "dravya," time and "direction," and amongst those brought under "guṇa," number, measurement, distinction, conjunction, disjunction, priority posteriority, heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, pleasure, pain, desire, effort, animosity, merit, demerit, and residual trace do not have any independent existence. Hence it is that the Śaivas have not included any one of these things in their categories. According to them, these are merely special categories which are based on the general category which is unity in multiplicity involving two things having independent existence and sometimes two special categories themselves.

Relation and the fundamental doctrine of the Śaivas.

[29]According to the Śaivas, the entire manifestation, whether subjective or objective is due to the Will of the Universal Self. Relation is nothing but a special category based on the general category—unity in multiplicity—involving two external realities. Because both the material and the subject that works on it are the manifestations of the ultimate, the relation, therefore, naturally does not end with the individual self, but ultimately depends upon the Universal Self.

The basic assumption of Śaiva Philosophy.

The basic assumption of Śaiva Philosophy is that the ultimate reality in the Universe is an All-Inclusive Universal Consciousness. The demonstration of this doctrine is the subject matter of the whole of the " Iśvarapratyabhijñā Vimarśinī." In the first six Āhnikas of the Jñānadhikāra, this truth is sought to be proved by means of an analysis of all our cognitions. It is shown there that the subject-object relation in all cognitions cannot be explained except on this assumption.

But that is only one kind of relation. There remain the various relations between the objects themselves. These relations are analysed in the seventh Āhnika and it is shown that they are also impossible except on the basis of the Universal Consciousness. This basis, alone, according to this system, can account not only for right knowledge, as shown in the first six Āhnikas, but also for " error."

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[29]न केवलं च संबन्धमयैकतास्पर्शिपरिमितमायाप्रमातृपर्यवसायि वस्तुप्रकाशनव्यापरः यावदनन्तचिन्मयशिवतावभासविश्रान्तैव प्रतिक्षणं वस्तुसंवित्क्रिया । न च संविदः क्रमोऽस्ति एकैवैकत्रैव क्षणेऽर्थप्रकाशनात् । सैव संबन्धशिवतामयमेव स्वरूपमाविष्करोतीत्युच्यते ॥

S. S., p. 9 (K.S.S. Edition).